Political parties, after almost two months since election to the second Constituent Assembly (CA), have finally sorted out differences about the election results and the debate on who will call the first meeting of the CA. The date for the first CA meeting has now been fixed for Wednesday. Against this context, Kamal Dev Bhattarai and Darshan Karki spoke to Tek Prasad Dhungana, legal advisor to the first CA (2008-2012), about the shortcomings of the last CA, the way forward to ensure that a constitution is produced within a year and the role of the donors in the constitution-writing process. All major political parties have promised that they will complete drafting the constitution within a year. Is this possible?
If the political parties are to fulfil their commitment, they will need to decide on a few things. First, the new CA should see its work as a continuation of the previous Assembly. Parties should take the decisions and work done by the first CA as reference material and head straight to the process of drafting the constitution. Preparing a draft of the statute will require finalising the defining elements of the constitution. All the issues on which an agreement was reached in the last CA were relatively simple matters. So the parties should sort out the defining elements of the constitution, ie, state restructuring, forms of governance, the electoral system and the relations between the executive, judiciary and legislature. If parties can agree to this and begin drafting the constitution, they can complete the task within a year. Else, it will be difficult to do so.
An informal agreement was apparently reached among parties in the last CA regarding some fundamental elements of the constitution. Since this is now a changed context, do you see the parties building on that understanding?
In the last CA, different concept papers and drafts were prepared at the thematic committee level. While doing so, there were differences of opinion among the various parties. The CA identified those issues and tried to resolve inter-party differences. Accordingly, many issues were formally resolved while political agreements were informally reached on others. However, since these decisions did not reach the formal process, we cannot say that they will remain the same.
The first CA sorted out simpler issues first and left the major ones to be dealt with later on. The new CA does not have the option to do the same. It should reach consensus on complex issues first and then move ahead. Completed work need not be repeated because the last CA also worked within a federal democratic republican framework. It worked to institutionalise the issues raised by the Janaandolan II and the new CA will also be doing the same thing.
What were the shortcomings of the first CA?
The last CA made two kinds of mistakes—some were procedural and others political. A grave mistake that the first CA committed was that it started drafting a constitution without reaching consensus on its defining elements. The next reason the Assembly could not work effectively was that it failed to understand that constitution-writing in a Nepali context is not an independent project. The constitution is not being written because Nepal has just gained independence or because it is a newly formed nation. We needed a new constitution to transform a
ten-year conflict into peace and to institutionalise the issues that were raised. Therefore, the peace process is an integral part of the new constitution. Though, ideally, the peace process should have been concluded before writing a new constitution. There are two important aspects of the peace process which are very important for constitution-writing—army integration and transitional justice, which is the formation of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) and a disappearance commission.
How did the focus on government formation affect the functioning of the CA?
This was another drawback of the first CA. Whether it was in the thematic committees or meetings, political party leaders had absolutely no focus on writing the constitution. Their sole focus was the formation of the government, which changed four times during the CA's tenure. Government formation is important and it is natural for political parties to seek a berth in the Cabinet. But when politicians do so at the expense of writing a constitution, it is a matter of concern. If we look at countries where a constitution has been written by a CA, whether it be India, South Africa or the US, leaders have led different forums and committees within the House. And when difficulties arose in writing the constitution, they rescued the process. But this was not seen in our CA. So a long-term government, which will last for at least the term of the CA, must be formed to ensure that a constitution will be written this time.
Quite a few CA members were involved in various controversies but could not be prosecuted in the absence of a specific law. Will a Code of Conduct help prevent these kinds of problems?
This is related to the fourth problem of the previous CA—an absence of procedural compliance. The CA Rules of Procedures broadly outlines eight to 10 points about how CA members should conduct themselves. It also has a provision to form a Conduct Monitoring Committee, which was never formed. CA members were found selling their red passports, stealing electricity, sending someone else in their place to appear for School Leaving Certificate exams and even found drunk and passed out on the streets. Had a Conduct Monitoring Committee been formed, it could have taken suo moto action against CA members, based on the reporting of their misconduct.
This time, the ordinance for the formation of the CA has a provision that bars people convicted of five to six crimes listed in it from being a CA member. This provision will be important if an incumbent CA member indulges in those crimes. In that case, it could lead to the expulsion of a member, resulting in an incomplete CA. The Rules of Procedure for the new CA should address such loopholes. There is a need to enrich the content on the conduct of the CA members too.
Last time, we saw the involvement of the donors in different processes of the CA. What was their role?
Different organisations held various interaction programmes outside the CA, invited CA members at a personal level and held discussions on issues of the constitution. To learn of the degree to which CA members were influenced by such discussions is a matter of study. Still, as the constitution is not only a national but an international document, it is natural for such discussions to be held. It can also help CA members understand the processes of writing a constitution, its principles and international practices. However, within the CA, the Parliament Secretariat only accepted logistical support from the United Nations Development Programme, the Government of India and various other embassies and organisations. It did not accept the role of any donor or foreign agency regarding the content of the constitution.
In what areas should the donor support be concentrated on, with regard to constitution-writing?
Donor agencies could support us when it comes to transitional justice. This issue has become more complicated now because a verdict was initially given for one commission to work for both truth and reconciliation as well as disappearance. A case was filed against this at the Supreme Court and the Apex Court has now directed the government to form separate commissions for truth and reconciliation and to investigate disappearances and also defined amnesty provisions. So different organisations who have worked in transitional justice issues in Brazil, Peru, South Africa,
Sierra Leone, Haiti and Sudan should assist Nepal, not to complicate matters, but simplify them. They can help resolve transitional justice issues by taking into account the value system of Nepal's political parties. Likewise, they should also keep providing logistical support to the Parliament Secretariat.
Lastly, 26 members have yet to be nominated to the CA? Can the first meeting of the CA be held without them?
When the first meeting of the former CA was held on May 28, 2008, we told the Prime Minister and all the top leaders that the CA has three constituencies: the first-past-the-post system (240), proportional system (320) and those that are nominated by the Cabinet (26). The process through which they become part of the CA is more important that the numbers they command. If the CA meeting is held without nominating a single candidate in the 26 seats, various constitutional and legal questions can arise. But our advice went unheeded. To take that incident as a precedent and repeat it would not be good practice. However, this is not to say that 601 members must be present for the first CA meeting. Even if 601 members are elected, they can be absent from the meeting for various reasons. But there is a difference between being absent due to personal reasons and absence due to the process of their nomination being
Ishizuka Kenji is deputy director at South Asia Division 4 of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Kenji is responsible for Nepal and Bangladesh at JICA headquarters in Tokyo. Mukul Humagain caught up with Kenji in Tokyo to talk about JICA’s operations in Nepal and its future assistance plans. Excerpts:Since Japan has resumed yen loans to Nepal, what would be the future areas of assistance from JICA?
JICA’s overall assistance strategy for Nepal is “Achievement of Equitable and Sustainable Growth”, and has set up three priorities as “infrastructure and institutional development for sustainable economic growth”, “consolidation of peace and steady transition to a democratic state”, and “rural poverty reduction”. In these priorities, particular emphasis of yen loan is upon hydro power and transport infrastructure.
With the resumption of yen loans, will there be any change in JICA’s priority with regard to assistance to Nepal?
There are no changes in the priorities and JICA considers the above mentioned areas for yen loan as important.
JICA last year agreed to give loan to Tanahu Hydro Power. Are there more loans in the cards for hydropower projects in Nepal?
In consideration of the serious power shortage situation in Nepal, hydropower development is one of the priority areas for us to support. The master plan study for hydropower development is currently underway through JICA technical cooperation.
With the Constituent Assembly election now over and a new government all set to be formed, Nepal is looking for much-needed political stability. In that scenario, will Japanese aid to Nepal increase in the near future?
JICA considers the process to democratic state and successful formulation of a new constitution are key important issues for the economic development of Nepal. In view of this situation, JICA supports democratic process and considers its continuous assistance.
Is JICA satisfied with the way Nepal has utilised Japanese assistance? How do you review JICA’s past investment and track record in Nepal?
Japan is one of the leading donors for Nepal, providing the most cumulative amount of assistance since 1960s, both in terms of net and disbursement basis. We consider Japanese assistance has contributed to the development of Nepal not only in quantity but also quality. In most cases, Nepal has utilised Japanese assistance effectively and efficiently.
For instance, the Sindhuli Road project which will be completed on March, 2015, is one of the projects with a significant impact after 20 years of continuous grant assistance by the Japanese government. The road has been constructed by Japanese contractor, which will be a good model for Nepal of road construction in hilly and mountainous areas. The Kathmandu-Baktapur road is also a good example which has contributed to not only traffic improvement but also economic development of Nepal with high quality and technical standard by Japanese contractor.
What are the distinctive characteristics of Japan’s ODA (official development assistance) loans and grants? How do developing countries evaluate ODA loans?
JICA assists and supports developing countries as the executing agency of Japanese ODA through ODA loans, grant aid and technical cooperation. JICA respects the ownership of developing countries and enhance the mutual understanding, good bilateral relationship, and human exchange not only through financial assistance but also dispatching Japanese experts, consultants, volunteers, and receiving Nepalese government officials to Japan every year.
One of the major concerns of donors is the Nepal government’s ability to utilise aid. What do you have to say on this? One of the major projects where JICA has given assistance is Melamchi Drinking Water Project. However, this project is yet to be completed and has faced so many controversies over the year.
The contract for civil work was concluded after 13 years from loan agreement in spite of all the issues in the past by efforts of both sides. It is very much important for resolving the water issue of Kathmandu to secure steady implementation and meet the deadline for the completion of construction work within 27 months.
However, as for the Nepal Government’s ability, there are some lessons through JICA’s past experience. For instance, the report of ex-post evaluation for “Agricultural Training and Extension Improvement Project” pointed out some problems as “at the level of the implementing agency, the approaches introduced by the Project were not incorporated in the agency, there were no specific implementation strategies, and no budget provisions were taken”. Budget and human resource allocation after the projects are key issues to enhance the sustainability and ability of Nepal Government.
What would be JICA’s initiative when it comes to the Nepali private sector?
It is good, but a challenging question for us. As the political situation stabilises and more private sector activity intensifies, there will be more possibilities of support in the future.
Many people say capacity building of the people and transfer of technology is Japan’s main development mantra. How is this concept being programmed in the Nepali context?
There are good examples of the combination of grant aid and technical cooperation in the Transportation Infrastructure Improvement Programme; Tribhuvan International Airport Modernization Project (grant aid to provide the airport surveillance radar) and the Project for the Development of a Spare Parts Management Centre and En-route Radar Control Services.
It aims not only to provide the equipment, but also to support capacity building of radar control in the airport, O&M capacity building for the airport related spare parts management centre.
Similarly, there is an integrated support such as the Sindhuli Road Construction Project (grant aid) and the Project for the Operation and Maintenance of Sindhuli Road (technical cooperation). The latter is especially formulated to enhance the capacity of O&M in regard with Sindhuli road.
NOV 25 -
With the counting of the votes cast under the first-past-the-post (FTPT) system of the second Constituent Assembly (CA) election over, the Nepali Congress (NC) has emerged as the largest party with 105 seats and the CPN-UML follows with 91 seats. The UCPN (Maoist), which had won 120 seats along with its breakaway CPN-Maoist faction, under FPTP in 2008, has been relegated to third position. It has only secured 25 seats so far. While the counting of ballots under proportional representation is underway, Darshan Karki spoke to political analyst Mumaram Khanal about the possible reasons for the UCPN (Maoist)’s resounding loss.
What accounts for the UCPN (Maoist)’s defeat in the election, compared to their sweeping victory in the 2008 CA election?
The Maoists established the agendas of federalism and republicanism. In 2008, they took these issues to the people and asked for votes. The Nepali people gave the Maoists the mandate to include all the aforementioned issues in the constitution. But they were unable to do so. Instead, they raised issues that were not part of the 2006 Janaandolan, like that of secularism and single-identity based federalism. The party also resorted to extreme casteist slogans. This affected the political equilibrium and the constitution could not be written in time. So despite being the largest party in the CA, the Maoist party was unable to do justice to its issues.
The primary reasons that led to the Maoists’ loss in the direct elections were:
Responsibilities without rights
The leadership of the Maoist party has always centred around one person. This is what communists, who believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat, do. Once the Maoist party embraced democratic processes and the peace process, it created multiple positions. However, while taking decisions within the party, the ones who had been delegated different responsibilities—the central committee and politburo members—would not be consulted. Pushpa Kamal Dahal did consult Baburam Bhattarai sometimes but not the rest. This increased the distance between the main leadership and the second-tier leaders within the party.
Class conversion
Another important reason for the loss of the Maoists was their lifestyle. The main leaders in particular became corrupt and part of the bourgeoisie they were protesting against. They began to lead a very non-transparent lifestyle, which led to the breakdown of their relationship with their cadres. As they travelled in vehicles, their relationship with those who travelled by foot broke down. The top rung leadership was in the company of a different class altogether. The cadres began to perceive the leadership as corrupt, that it no longer represented the proletariats but had been transformed into neo-elites. The district-level leaders began copying the consumerist lifestyle of top leaders too. So the class affection that had bound party cadres together ceased to exist. The leadership, through its own actions, sent a message to the cadres that they should all think of bettering their own lives first and not run after the party.
Status of former ‘People’s Liberation Army’ (PLA) soldiers
The ex-PLA soldiers—some of whom got money while others got nothing—who had gone to live back in their villages are the ones who suffered the most. They lead a miserable life. So, on the one hand, the Maoist voters saw the plight of these fighters and on the other, they saw the Maoist leaders on television, travelling in expensive vehicles and flying in helicopters. In the villages, people encountered ex-fighters and cadres who were scolding the leaders everyday, lamenting that, had they not joined the party, they would be leading better lives now. The prevalent sentiment is that the party destroyed their lives and did not look after them. There is widespread anger among ex-soldiers. But the Maoist leadership never tried to learn of the party’s situation at the village level.
Distribution of tickets
While distributing the tickets for elections, selfless cadres who had been with the party since the time of the war were not given tickets nor were their names included in the proportional list. Instead, new people and those that had quit other parties to join the UCPN (Maoist) were given tickets. This angered deserving candidates and they made sure that the party’s candidate would lose. I met many people who were willing to contest election as alternate (bagi) candidates but did not even have Rs 3,000 to register. Instead, they started a grassroots campaign to punish their own leaders.
Loss of credibility among intellectuals
The Maoists also lost credibility among middle-class intellectuals. When the Maoists were in government, their own people turned out to be the most corrupt. So the middle-class, who had great expectations from the Maoists, was disillusioned. The Maoists would react to small matters emotionally but remain indifferent to serious political issues.
Alliance with Madhesi parties
When the Maoists formed a coalition with Madhesi parties in the CA, it shattered whatever little hope people had in them. The two had no common political agenda. The elites from the Madhes, who had benefited from the political system since the Panchayat era, tried to profit from the Madhes Movement. Instead of giving rights to the Madhesi people, the Maoists and the Madhesi parties forged an alliance to form an oligarchy, which would benefit them both. Later, they brought in Janajati elites to this club too. This greatly angered the different tiers of leadership within the Maoist party, which saw that top leaders had the freedom to collaborate with any force, even those that had no relationship to Marxism at all. This made it clear to people with some degree of political understanding that the Maoist party was not a principled, intellectual force.
Intra-party disputes
There were many fights at the top leadership level regarding the delegation of roles. Dahal would handpick a junior level party member and give him a higher position. While the likes of CP Gajurel were never given ministerial posts, members of the Rajya Samiti were made Finance Minister and Minister of Physical Planning. Dahal paralysed the party hierarchy. Once people began to see through him, a never-ending tussle began within the party. This continuous squabbling and division in leadership did not allow party cadres to unite.
No participation in decision-making
In its earlier days, the structure of the Maoist party was small. When I was in the party, the Central Committee only consisted of 31-32 people. We held meetings for six to seven days. Decisions were taken with everyone’s participation. However, of late, the Central Committee consists of 300 to 400 people. The meeting of this Committee ends in three hours. Instead of being a part of the decision making process, the Committee is merely informed of the decisions taken by the party leadership. There are around 500 Rajya Samitis and 700 District Committees. Intellectual discussions that are integral to communist parties have stopped taking place. Communist parties are cadre-based parties; the cadres discuss all issues and then pass it on to the higher levels. This practice ended as though it were a mass-based party. Party members who were accountable to the people and interested in politics all quit the party. New members, who only wanted to take benefit from the party, joined in large numbers.
Party split and restructuring
After the split in the party, there was a need to restructure the UCPN (Maoist). But it did not do so. After cadres left to join the Mohan Baidya-led CPN-Maoist, the UCPN (Maoist) reorganised the ones who stayed back. But it did not take into account their experience or capabilities while delegating responsibilities. Additionally, voters repeatedly heard the Baidya Maoists accuse the UCPN (Maoist) of being traitors to the ‘People’s War’ and surrendering to national and international forces. The Dahal-led Maoists did not organise any programme to denounce these accusations. In many places, Baidya-led Maoist cadres voted for the candidate of another party and encouraged others to do so.
Does the reaction of the UCPN (Maoist) to its loss say something about its political culture?
The party lacks the ability to strike a fine balance when needed and has no schooling on political accountability. The party could have easily accepted its victories and losses but accepting democratic processes when it wins and rejecting them when it loses raises questions about its political character. Dahal is taking this issue too lightly. As a former prime minister, he is part of the system. He willingly took part in the CA elections and now that the results are not favourable, he cannot simply extricate himself.
Could this loss bring the UCPN (Maoist) and the CPN-Maoist closer together?
If Dahal keeps saying that the party will stay out of the CA, he will have no option other than to unite with the Baidya-led Maoists. However, the rest of the party will not merge. Baburam Bhattarai can be expected to eventually accept the election results.
How will the Maoist loss affect the national politics?
Conflict of a different kind will arise. The nation seeks political stability but it will not achieve it so easily. However, the constitution will be written. Going by the poll outcomes, the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML can form an alliance to secure a two-thirds majority. The UCPN (Maoist) should enter the CA and exert pressure. All parties—the Maoists, NC, UML, Madhesi parties—agree on democratic republicanism and secularism. Only the Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal differs but its strength will be negligible if the rest remain united. So it is very important that the UCPN (Maoist) becomes a part of the political process.
What accounts for the UCPN (Maoist)’s defeat in the election, compared to their sweeping victory in the 2008 CA election?
The Maoists established the agendas of federalism and republicanism. In 2008, they took these issues to the people and asked for votes. The Nepali people gave the Maoists the mandate to include all the aforementioned issues in the constitution. But they were unable to do so. Instead, they raised issues that were not part of the 2006 Janaandolan, like that of secularism and single-identity based federalism. The party also resorted to extreme casteist slogans. This affected the political equilibrium and the constitution could not be written in time. So despite being the largest party in the CA, the Maoist party was unable to do justice to its issues.
The primary reasons that led to the Maoists’ loss in the direct elections were:
Responsibilities without rights
The leadership of the Maoist party has always centred around one person. This is what communists, who believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat, do. Once the Maoist party embraced democratic processes and the peace process, it created multiple positions. However, while taking decisions within the party, the ones who had been delegated different responsibilities—the central committee and politburo members—would not be consulted. Pushpa Kamal Dahal did consult Baburam Bhattarai sometimes but not the rest. This increased the distance between the main leadership and the second-tier leaders within the party.
Class conversion
Another important reason for the loss of the Maoists was their lifestyle. The main leaders in particular became corrupt and part of the bourgeoisie they were protesting against. They began to lead a very non-transparent lifestyle, which led to the breakdown of their relationship with their cadres. As they travelled in vehicles, their relationship with those who travelled by foot broke down. The top rung leadership was in the company of a different class altogether. The cadres began to perceive the leadership as corrupt, that it no longer represented the proletariats but had been transformed into neo-elites. The district-level leaders began copying the consumerist lifestyle of top leaders too. So the class affection that had bound party cadres together ceased to exist. The leadership, through its own actions, sent a message to the cadres that they should all think of bettering their own lives first and not run after the party.
Status of former ‘People’s Liberation Army’ (PLA) soldiers
The ex-PLA soldiers—some of whom got money while others got nothing—who had gone to live back in their villages are the ones who suffered the most. They lead a miserable life. So, on the one hand, the Maoist voters saw the plight of these fighters and on the other, they saw the Maoist leaders on television, travelling in expensive vehicles and flying in helicopters. In the villages, people encountered ex-fighters and cadres who were scolding the leaders everyday, lamenting that, had they not joined the party, they would be leading better lives now. The prevalent sentiment is that the party destroyed their lives and did not look after them. There is widespread anger among ex-soldiers. But the Maoist leadership never tried to learn of the party’s situation at the village level.
Distribution of tickets
While distributing the tickets for elections, selfless cadres who had been with the party since the time of the war were not given tickets nor were their names included in the proportional list. Instead, new people and those that had quit other parties to join the UCPN (Maoist) were given tickets. This angered deserving candidates and they made sure that the party’s candidate would lose. I met many people who were willing to contest election as alternate (bagi) candidates but did not even have Rs 3,000 to register. Instead, they started a grassroots campaign to punish their own leaders.
Loss of credibility among intellectuals
The Maoists also lost credibility among middle-class intellectuals. When the Maoists were in government, their own people turned out to be the most corrupt. So the middle-class, who had great expectations from the Maoists, was disillusioned. The Maoists would react to small matters emotionally but remain indifferent to serious political issues.
Alliance with Madhesi parties
When the Maoists formed a coalition with Madhesi parties in the CA, it shattered whatever little hope people had in them. The two had no common political agenda. The elites from the Madhes, who had benefited from the political system since the Panchayat era, tried to profit from the Madhes Movement. Instead of giving rights to the Madhesi people, the Maoists and the Madhesi parties forged an alliance to form an oligarchy, which would benefit them both. Later, they brought in Janajati elites to this club too. This greatly angered the different tiers of leadership within the Maoist party, which saw that top leaders had the freedom to collaborate with any force, even those that had no relationship to Marxism at all. This made it clear to people with some degree of political understanding that the Maoist party was not a principled, intellectual force.
Intra-party disputes
There were many fights at the top leadership level regarding the delegation of roles. Dahal would handpick a junior level party member and give him a higher position. While the likes of CP Gajurel were never given ministerial posts, members of the Rajya Samiti were made Finance Minister and Minister of Physical Planning. Dahal paralysed the party hierarchy. Once people began to see through him, a never-ending tussle began within the party. This continuous squabbling and division in leadership did not allow party cadres to unite.
No participation in decision-making
In its earlier days, the structure of the Maoist party was small. When I was in the party, the Central Committee only consisted of 31-32 people. We held meetings for six to seven days. Decisions were taken with everyone’s participation. However, of late, the Central Committee consists of 300 to 400 people. The meeting of this Committee ends in three hours. Instead of being a part of the decision making process, the Committee is merely informed of the decisions taken by the party leadership. There are around 500 Rajya Samitis and 700 District Committees. Intellectual discussions that are integral to communist parties have stopped taking place. Communist parties are cadre-based parties; the cadres discuss all issues and then pass it on to the higher levels. This practice ended as though it were a mass-based party. Party members who were accountable to the people and interested in politics all quit the party. New members, who only wanted to take benefit from the party, joined in large numbers.
Party split and restructuring
After the split in the party, there was a need to restructure the UCPN (Maoist). But it did not do so. After cadres left to join the Mohan Baidya-led CPN-Maoist, the UCPN (Maoist) reorganised the ones who stayed back. But it did not take into account their experience or capabilities while delegating responsibilities. Additionally, voters repeatedly heard the Baidya Maoists accuse the UCPN (Maoist) of being traitors to the ‘People’s War’ and surrendering to national and international forces. The Dahal-led Maoists did not organise any programme to denounce these accusations. In many places, Baidya-led Maoist cadres voted for the candidate of another party and encouraged others to do so.
Does the reaction of the UCPN (Maoist) to its loss say something about its political culture?
The party lacks the ability to strike a fine balance when needed and has no schooling on political accountability. The party could have easily accepted its victories and losses but accepting democratic processes when it wins and rejecting them when it loses raises questions about its political character. Dahal is taking this issue too lightly. As a former prime minister, he is part of the system. He willingly took part in the CA elections and now that the results are not favourable, he cannot simply extricate himself.
Could this loss bring the UCPN (Maoist) and the CPN-Maoist closer together?
If Dahal keeps saying that the party will stay out of the CA, he will have no option other than to unite with the Baidya-led Maoists. However, the rest of the party will not merge. Baburam Bhattarai can be expected to eventually accept the election results.
How will the Maoist loss affect the national politics?
Conflict of a different kind will arise. The nation seeks political stability but it will not achieve it so easily. However, the constitution will be written. Going by the poll outcomes, the Nepali Congress (NC) and CPN-UML can form an alliance to secure a two-thirds majority. The UCPN (Maoist) should enter the CA and exert pressure. All parties—the Maoists, NC, UML, Madhesi parties—agree on democratic republicanism and secularism. Only the Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal differs but its strength will be negligible if the rest remain united. So it is very important that the UCPN (Maoist) becomes a part of the political process.
FEB 18 -
Indian Ambassador Ranjit Rae arrived in Kathmandu in September last year, when the country had embarked on the election cycle. He has largely managed to avoid major controversies, something not all his predecessors managed to do and has taken up the mantle at Lainchour, arguably Kathmandu’s most important diplomatic mission, at a time of relative calm in Nepal-India ties. Crucially, Rae was Joint Secretary (2002-06) with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs at its North Desk, which looks after Nepal affairs. That was a period when New Delhi actively facilitated a peace deal between Nepal’s parliamentary parties (the Seven Party Alliance, SPA) and the Maoists, who were still underground. Right through the 2006 Janaandolan and the subsequent peace process, New Delhi has remained an active player in Nepal’s transition, often courting ire from various quarters in Nepal. In an hour-long exclusive interview with Editor-in-Chief of The Kathmandu Post Akhilesh Upadhyay and Editor-in-Chief of Kantipur Sudheer Sharma, Rae described current Nepal-India ties as excellent and explained that Nepal’s ‘stability, security and prosperity’ were fundamental strategic objectives of India’s foreign policy towards Nepal.
How would you describe the current state of Nepal-India relations?
I can describe it in one word, ie, excellent. Our relations are very ancient, wide-ranging, warm and cordial. And in the new global context of economic reform and globalisation policies in India, they have opened up many new opportunities. So the challenge before us today is to build upon the age-old friendship we have and see how to make it even more dynamic.
What are New Delhi’s major foreign policy goals in Nepal?
India and Nepal are very close friends and neighbours that share an open border. Our prime minister has said on more than one occasion that if India is to prosper, if India is to grow, if India is to reduce poverty amongst her people, then India needs peace, stability and friendship in her neighbourhood and especially in a country like Nepal with which we share open borders. If there is no peace and prosperity in India, Nepal will not be able to prosper either. The most important thing is to have peace, stability, security and prosperity in Nepal. So that is clearly a very fundamental strategic objective that is common to both Nepal and India.
Second, how do we make this relationship even stronger? I would specially identify economic areas. If we can take our economic cooperation to new levels that will really cement the relationship between our two countries. So I think these are the two fundamental objectives that we feel are common between India and Nepal.
Currently, we are in the middle of completing a peace process and a constitution. Do you see these processes heading towards the right direction, or what challenges do you see in completing them?
I think the peace process has been a great achievement for Nepal. It is a very positive development that has brought peace and stability in this country. Second, as far as transitions are concerned, I think Nepal is going through multiple transitions. There is the transition from monarchy to a republican system; the transition from a Hindu state to a secular state and the economic transition. There is also the process of constitution formation. So, if you see step-by-step, considerable progress has been made: elections have been held, a government has been formed and everyone is committed to enacting a constitution within a year. I think that will consolidate multi-party democracy and provide a very strong framework for development, stability, prosperity and inclusive growth. If you look at all of South Asia today, I think the one striking feature is that all the countries in the region are now multiparty democracies.
In light of the ongoing transition, and that the Nepali Congress (NC) is now leading the government after a fresh mandate, what kind of relations does New Delhi have with our political parties—the NC, CPN-UML, UCPN (Maoist) and parties to the right of the centre?
The first thing I would like to say is that both our countries are multiparty democracies; India and Nepal both have many political parties with different views. But the important thing is, on an issue like Nepal, all political parties in India share the same view and attach the same importance to the relationship with Nepal. There is consensus in terms of the way we look at Nepal in India, in terms of both approach and policies. I feel that the same is true of the political parties in Nepal.
The second point is, many political parties in Nepal and India share a very ancient and historic connection. With some political parties, the relationship is many decades old, with others it may be relatively new and there may be no relationship with some other parties right now. I feel that this relationship between the political parties is very important.
NC leaders were in India during its freedom struggle, for example. A number of our party leaders, likewise, have relationships with Indian leaders and there are party-to-party relationships too.
I have already made a general comment and certainly, we have great respect for the NC and for the contributions its leaders made to the Indian freedom struggle. I don’t think you would find this kind of example in many other countries of the world. This is certainly something we greatly appreciate and admire. It has contributed to the strong cooperation between the two countries. But that does not mean that the relationships with the parties that have come up subsequently are in any way different. I think every party, in its own way, has made significant contributions to Nepal and India-Nepal cooperation. It is our desire to strengthen our political relationship with every political party that is active in Nepal.
How do you view the second largest party, the CPN-UML?
We have very good relations with the CPN-UML, the UCPN (Maoist) and the Madhesi political parties. We have worked closely with each of these parties. As they have all been represented in the government, political leaders are known to us and we are committed to further stepping up our cooperation, not only between the two governments but also at the level of leaders and political parties.
To focus on party relations, one charge against the Indian establishment has been that it engages in a certain degree of micro-management of Nepal’s political parties, which are fundamentally independent institutions.
First, I would like to say that the Government of India and the Indian Embassy have no intention of micro-managing anything in Nepal. The only objective we have and what we wish for our friends in Nepal is stability and prosperity. And we hope very much that whatever we do in Nepal is for the mutual benefit of Nepal and India. My very firm conviction is that, at a fundamental level, there is convergence in terms of our national interests. I don’t see any fundamental divergence. Of course, in any close relationship, especially between neighbours with open borders, there will be irritants from time to time. Let me tell your readers that we have nothing but the best wishes and support for Nepal. There may be a perception of micro-management, which I see from the perspective of some newspapers and articles.
It is often said that as far as Delhi is concerned, three actors basically decide the larger bilateral relations: the Indian Ambassador, the National Security Advisor and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) chief.
I think this is a gross oversimplification of the way policies and decisions are made in the Government of India. We are a democracy and there is a certain process of decision making. It is also based on the political leadership. Eventually, the political leadership gives the political line in terms of what our approach should be. Then decisions are taken through a very comprehensive discussion across organisations and institutions involved in any approach. So I wouldn’t simplify it in the manner in which you have presented your question. I think it is a much more complex process and, as I said, there is wide political consensus in India in terms of policy and approach towards Nepal.
On some occasions, you have mentioned that India and Nepal could have common interests, mainly on security and development issues. Can you elaborate?
Let me talk about security first. In this era of globalisation and interdependence, peace, prosperity and security have become indivisible. When something happens in one country, it affects another country and they may not even be neighbours, as we have seen in the last 10-15 years. India and Nepal are neighbours with open borders. So clearly, peace and stability in one country has a direct impact in terms of peace and stability in the other. Security is thus a very important element of this bilateral relationship. And I am very happy to inform you that both our countries see our security as interlinked. So India and Nepal are coming together to ensure that nothing happens which causes insecurity in the other country. Second, we have very good cooperation between our security forces, whether it is the police or the military. This is in the traditional sense. In a broader sense, if you look at economic security, climate change or disaster management, security has a wider dimension. We are cooperating on those areas too.
In so far as economic cooperation is concerned, the India of today is very different from India before the 1990s. Post our liberalisation programme, we have clearly unleashed the entrepreneurial energies of our people. India is now growing at a much higher trajectory. We are almost a two-trillion-dollar economy. Of course, this year, we are expected to grow at about 5 percent but we were growing at 8 to 9 percent. Every year, we are adding something like $180 billion to the size of our GDP. I see great opportunities for Nepal in benefitting from this huge economic growth that is taking place in India. I think the challenge is to identify sectors where Nepal can take advantage of this economic growth.
Going back to the question of security, what are the specific areas of concern India has with Nepal vis-à-vis the open border?
There have been terrorism-related cases, fake Indian currency smuggling, gold smuggling and trafficking of protected species. Also, because we have an open border, someone commits a crime in one country and runs to the other. I think this is a problem for both countries.
The open border between India and Nepal can bring a lot of positive advantages but sometimes, unfortunately, they are also misused by people who do not have the best interests of the two countries at heart. I think both countries are committed to ensuring that this misuse is minimised and prevented.
On that, how would you describe the current framework for cooperation vis-à-vis border security? And what level of satisfaction do you have in terms of our security establishment’s execution of the existing framework?
We have very good cooperation between the Indian and Nepali security forces. I think the legal frameworks could be improved. At a political level, we have to be very conscious of each other’s interests and requirements. At the execution level too there is good cooperation now. What is good about this cooperation is that it is now taking place in smaller units at the operational level. Of course, it is important at the central level but to improve security, it is more important to have good cooperation at the level of the border districts. This is moving on very satisfactorily. We have regular border district coordination meetings where these issues are discussed.
You talked about the porous border. Do you think putting a registration mechanism in place for citizens of both countries would help control fake currency smuggling and other terrorist activities?
At the fundamental level, I think open borders are a very good thing. If you look at all the regional cooperation and organisations wherever they exist, they have completely open borders like in the European Union. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) is also moving in that direction. But an open border sometimes leads to problems. Clearly, we have to step up our cooperation and coordination to ensure that the benefits are maximised and the problems are minimised. To do so, you definitely need to have regulation and more patrolling along the border but the border needs to remain open. This has been so traditionally for centuries. People of the two countries have such close relationships across the border, you may even go shopping from one country to the other or a school. People cross the border many times in a day. This lies at the heart of the relationship between the two countries. So I would like to encourage this, rather than control it.
One area where Nepal has clear potential is hydropower. Nepal’s hydropower establishment has requested India to reciprocate in a power-sharing agreement but that has not happened at the government level. Should it occur, prospective investors would at least know that there is a power-exchange mechanism in place and they can invest within that framework knowing very well that they have an assured market in India.
For your readers’ information, I would like to say that, India, despite being a power-deficit country, actually exports power to Nepal. We have committed to export some 200 megawatt of power to Nepal. Second, hydropower possibly offers the most significant opportunity to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries. There are many ways in which this can be done. It can be done at the government-to-government level, as we have committed in the Pacheshwor Multipurpose Project under the Mahakali Treaty. It could be done at the private sector level, as is being done in the case of Upper Karnali or Upper Marsyangdi or even Arun III where Indian private companies have been given the opportunity to develop them. What has happened over the years is that progress has been extremely slow. In fact, we have not had a major hydropower project for many decades. And sometimes, people tend to become cynical.
As to the power-trade agreement, it is certainly very important. But if I may inform you, India has already put power-trade under the OGL (Open General Licence). So you are free to trade power with India without any licence or specific approval. As far as I understand, from a technical perspective, in hydropower projects, a certain basic minimum has to be sold through a long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and you trade at the margins. So the viability of the project is not actually determined by the share of the power you trade but by the long-term PPA you have. The power trade price can go up and down, that is on the margin. So I don’t think that the power trade between the two countries, whether it be at the government or private sector level, is held up because of the power trade agreement. But yes, we do have a proposal for a power trade agreement, which is under consideration at the Government of India. And we will do whatever is required to promote and step up cooperation.
The current transmission line that runs from Dhalkebar in Nepal to Muzzafarpur in India is not complete yet. During our rainy season, we have a power surplus which can be exported to India. But we haven’t been able to do so because of the current infrastructure, ie, the transmission line does not support it. Progress on the Indian side has not been very satisfactory.
I agree with you. I think it is very important to set up infrastructure that will allow for power exchange and trade. Right now, we are engaged in the development and renovation of three transmission lines. It is currently a point-to-point power exchange. Eventually the idea should be to connect the two (Nepal and India’s) electricity grids so that there is seamless transmission of power. I remember reading in one of the newspapers a couple of weeks ago that because of the lack of Indian customs clearance, loadshedding in Nepal is going to increase by so many hours everyday. We, of course, rebutted that very strongly.
This is a very high priority project. India is already committed to exporting more than 200 MW of power to Nepal and that can only happen if the transmission lines are upgraded. In order to make sure that the transmission lines are upgraded, certain procedural things and customs and other related formalities have to be completed. All these have been explained to the Nepal Electricity Authority and I am happy to say that are working very strongly on all these issues.
India is helping Nepal in various small projects like building schools and health centres all over the country. Some people wonder, why doesn’t India concentrate on investing in large infrastructural projects rather than providing such scattered assistance to Nepal? Is there a possibility for doing so instead?
First of all, thank you for raising this question. I would like to give you some information about the scope and range of our assistance. India is assisting in some 484 projects in Nepal at a total cost of something like 60 billion Nepali rupees. It is a very huge assistance programme. This does not include the concessional lines of credit that we have given. In recent years, we have two ongoing lines of credit of 350 million dollars for infrastructural development. So India has a huge assistance and partnership programme and this covers both large and small projects. The Mahendra Highway, the East-West optical fibre network to facilitate internet and mobile telecommunications in Nepal, the BP Koirala Institute for Health Sciences and trauma centre in Kathmandu are some of the large infrastructural projects. There are also some irrigation projects and Tarai roads projects: some 1,400 km of roads are to be developed. We are developing railway lines along the India-Nepal border, integrated check posts. And we have over 225 small projects like schools, dispensaries, small roads.
Our approach is a combination of large and small development projects. But I agree with you that we need to review some of our schemes and particularly our small development schemes. I am very keen to ensure two things now. First, that the local community is a genuine stakeholder in that project; they want the project. Second, we must ensure that these projects are sustainable.
The other component of the question is, are there any large infrastructural projects with Indian assistance that coming up?
Well, we have the Tarai roads projects and the integrated check posts project. These are two very large infrastructural projects. We also have the transmission lines projects financed under Indian lines of credit. There are also other projects in the pipeline in which more discussions need to be held: like a bridge on the Mahakali River and talk of a Mid-hill highway. But I think we must focus our energies on what we have.
That brings us to our last segment, international relations. Do you see any cooperation between India and China in large infrastructural projects in Nepal?
First of all, cooperation between India and China is very robust. Our bilateral trade is around $65 billion and likely to go up a $100 billion in the next couple of years. Cooperation between the two cou-ntries is very vibrant, robust and mutually beneficial, including in the power sector in India. Certainly, there could be cooperation between our companies.
The point is, has there been any discussion regarding India and China jointly investing in a large infrastructure project in Nepal?
For many large projects you need huge amount of resources. And where are these resources going to come from? You need companies that have to undertake engineering, procurement and construction contracts. Most of these projects are through global contracts. Clearly, there are opportunities. As far as India or Nepal is concerned, the primary objective is to develop power. You need energy to fuel your economy, just as India needs it for the same. I think there are opportunities and the private sectors engaged are conscious of it. But the first thing to do is get a power development agreement. Only then can you start talking about financial closure and awarding of contracts and so on. Right now, even the PPAs have not even been finalised, though discussions have been going on for a long time.
What are convergent and divergent views of India and China regarding Nepal’s politics and transition?
I can talk about India. I think peace and stability in Nepal is very important for India. I think that is the same for China. Clearly, there is convergence in terms of the objective of peace, security, stability and prosperity in Nepal. I must say that the international community as a whole has worked very closely in recent years, even in terms of political transitions that have been taking place in Nepal. You would recall, 10 days prior to the last Constituent Assembly elections, people were skeptical including many journalists. There were questions whether the election would be held or not even one week before the election. And the international community stood as one and supported this whole process. I think it is not only India and China but this general convergence amongst the international community in terms of how they see developments in Nepal and the overall goal of stability and peace.
There seems to be a certain level of nervousness about Chinese investments in Nepal in the Indian intelligentsia and among its think tanks, which is clearly reflected in the Indian media.
The defining characteristic of our times is the economic rise of Asia: of India, of China and the continent as a whole. The centre of global economic gravity is shifting towards Asia. Clearly, the Asian footprint is going to expand, not only in Asia but all over the world. So the Chinese are investing in India, Nepal, South-east Asia, Europe, Africa. Indians are doing the same. We are talking about connectivity between India and Asean. We are talking about driving from Calcutta to Kunming and the Bangladesh-China, India-Myanmar forum for regional cooperation initiative. As economies get more interdependent, more interlinked, this will be a factor in promoting stability in the countries concerned. India and China have very vibrant and strong cooperation in every sector.
So how do you explain the unease that we encounter regarding Chinese investments in Nepal?
I cannot speak for individual analysts or strategic experts. Perhaps you have to address the question to them. What I am trying to say is that this is the development of our times. And you have to see how best you can take advantage of these developments.
Moving on, what kind of relationship does Washington, another major ally, and New Delhi share vis-à-vis Nepal?
Let me tell you again that India and Washington also have a very vibrant and robust relationship based on shared democratic norms and values. Clearly, we discuss issues of mutual interest. If we have a bilateral discussion then we might discuss developments in the region. For instance, we would like very much to know what is going on in Afghanistan. These are normal state-to-state interactions. The ambassadors here meet from time to time; I meet with the Chinese ambassador and the American ambassador.
As Kathmandu happens to be the Saarc capital, one of the major irritants for Saarc regionalism has been that India and Pakistan do not see eye-to-eye on regional issues. Where do you see this going?
See, when Saarc was conceived, it was precisely for this reason. It was agreed that bilateral issues would be kept out of Saarc. The idea was, you may have political differences but that does not prevent you from having economic cooperation, which can be mutually beneficial.
But the fact is that intra-regional cooperation has developed from strength to strength in Asean. Their intra-regional trade now runs in the billions. Saarc, however, is stuck where we started.
I agree with you. Our progress has been slow and not at a satisfactory pace. Ideally, as I said, we should put aside political differences and focus on the economic situation, which is win-win for all the countries concerned.
Indian Ambassador Ranjit Rae arrived in Kathmandu in September last year, when the country had embarked on the election cycle. He has largely managed to avoid major controversies, something not all his predecessors managed to do and has taken up the mantle at Lainchour, arguably Kathmandu’s most important diplomatic mission, at a time of relative calm in Nepal-India ties. Crucially, Rae was Joint Secretary (2002-06) with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs at its North Desk, which looks after Nepal affairs. That was a period when New Delhi actively facilitated a peace deal between Nepal’s parliamentary parties (the Seven Party Alliance, SPA) and the Maoists, who were still underground. Right through the 2006 Janaandolan and the subsequent peace process, New Delhi has remained an active player in Nepal’s transition, often courting ire from various quarters in Nepal. In an hour-long exclusive interview with Editor-in-Chief of The Kathmandu Post Akhilesh Upadhyay and Editor-in-Chief of Kantipur Sudheer Sharma, Rae described current Nepal-India ties as excellent and explained that Nepal’s ‘stability, security and prosperity’ were fundamental strategic objectives of India’s foreign policy towards Nepal.
How would you describe the current state of Nepal-India relations?
I can describe it in one word, ie, excellent. Our relations are very ancient, wide-ranging, warm and cordial. And in the new global context of economic reform and globalisation policies in India, they have opened up many new opportunities. So the challenge before us today is to build upon the age-old friendship we have and see how to make it even more dynamic.
What are New Delhi’s major foreign policy goals in Nepal?
India and Nepal are very close friends and neighbours that share an open border. Our prime minister has said on more than one occasion that if India is to prosper, if India is to grow, if India is to reduce poverty amongst her people, then India needs peace, stability and friendship in her neighbourhood and especially in a country like Nepal with which we share open borders. If there is no peace and prosperity in India, Nepal will not be able to prosper either. The most important thing is to have peace, stability, security and prosperity in Nepal. So that is clearly a very fundamental strategic objective that is common to both Nepal and India.
Second, how do we make this relationship even stronger? I would specially identify economic areas. If we can take our economic cooperation to new levels that will really cement the relationship between our two countries. So I think these are the two fundamental objectives that we feel are common between India and Nepal.
Currently, we are in the middle of completing a peace process and a constitution. Do you see these processes heading towards the right direction, or what challenges do you see in completing them?
I think the peace process has been a great achievement for Nepal. It is a very positive development that has brought peace and stability in this country. Second, as far as transitions are concerned, I think Nepal is going through multiple transitions. There is the transition from monarchy to a republican system; the transition from a Hindu state to a secular state and the economic transition. There is also the process of constitution formation. So, if you see step-by-step, considerable progress has been made: elections have been held, a government has been formed and everyone is committed to enacting a constitution within a year. I think that will consolidate multi-party democracy and provide a very strong framework for development, stability, prosperity and inclusive growth. If you look at all of South Asia today, I think the one striking feature is that all the countries in the region are now multiparty democracies.
In light of the ongoing transition, and that the Nepali Congress (NC) is now leading the government after a fresh mandate, what kind of relations does New Delhi have with our political parties—the NC, CPN-UML, UCPN (Maoist) and parties to the right of the centre?
The first thing I would like to say is that both our countries are multiparty democracies; India and Nepal both have many political parties with different views. But the important thing is, on an issue like Nepal, all political parties in India share the same view and attach the same importance to the relationship with Nepal. There is consensus in terms of the way we look at Nepal in India, in terms of both approach and policies. I feel that the same is true of the political parties in Nepal.
The second point is, many political parties in Nepal and India share a very ancient and historic connection. With some political parties, the relationship is many decades old, with others it may be relatively new and there may be no relationship with some other parties right now. I feel that this relationship between the political parties is very important.
NC leaders were in India during its freedom struggle, for example. A number of our party leaders, likewise, have relationships with Indian leaders and there are party-to-party relationships too.
I have already made a general comment and certainly, we have great respect for the NC and for the contributions its leaders made to the Indian freedom struggle. I don’t think you would find this kind of example in many other countries of the world. This is certainly something we greatly appreciate and admire. It has contributed to the strong cooperation between the two countries. But that does not mean that the relationships with the parties that have come up subsequently are in any way different. I think every party, in its own way, has made significant contributions to Nepal and India-Nepal cooperation. It is our desire to strengthen our political relationship with every political party that is active in Nepal.
How do you view the second largest party, the CPN-UML?
We have very good relations with the CPN-UML, the UCPN (Maoist) and the Madhesi political parties. We have worked closely with each of these parties. As they have all been represented in the government, political leaders are known to us and we are committed to further stepping up our cooperation, not only between the two governments but also at the level of leaders and political parties.
To focus on party relations, one charge against the Indian establishment has been that it engages in a certain degree of micro-management of Nepal’s political parties, which are fundamentally independent institutions.
First, I would like to say that the Government of India and the Indian Embassy have no intention of micro-managing anything in Nepal. The only objective we have and what we wish for our friends in Nepal is stability and prosperity. And we hope very much that whatever we do in Nepal is for the mutual benefit of Nepal and India. My very firm conviction is that, at a fundamental level, there is convergence in terms of our national interests. I don’t see any fundamental divergence. Of course, in any close relationship, especially between neighbours with open borders, there will be irritants from time to time. Let me tell your readers that we have nothing but the best wishes and support for Nepal. There may be a perception of micro-management, which I see from the perspective of some newspapers and articles.
It is often said that as far as Delhi is concerned, three actors basically decide the larger bilateral relations: the Indian Ambassador, the National Security Advisor and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) chief.
I think this is a gross oversimplification of the way policies and decisions are made in the Government of India. We are a democracy and there is a certain process of decision making. It is also based on the political leadership. Eventually, the political leadership gives the political line in terms of what our approach should be. Then decisions are taken through a very comprehensive discussion across organisations and institutions involved in any approach. So I wouldn’t simplify it in the manner in which you have presented your question. I think it is a much more complex process and, as I said, there is wide political consensus in India in terms of policy and approach towards Nepal.
On some occasions, you have mentioned that India and Nepal could have common interests, mainly on security and development issues. Can you elaborate?
Let me talk about security first. In this era of globalisation and interdependence, peace, prosperity and security have become indivisible. When something happens in one country, it affects another country and they may not even be neighbours, as we have seen in the last 10-15 years. India and Nepal are neighbours with open borders. So clearly, peace and stability in one country has a direct impact in terms of peace and stability in the other. Security is thus a very important element of this bilateral relationship. And I am very happy to inform you that both our countries see our security as interlinked. So India and Nepal are coming together to ensure that nothing happens which causes insecurity in the other country. Second, we have very good cooperation between our security forces, whether it is the police or the military. This is in the traditional sense. In a broader sense, if you look at economic security, climate change or disaster management, security has a wider dimension. We are cooperating on those areas too.
In so far as economic cooperation is concerned, the India of today is very different from India before the 1990s. Post our liberalisation programme, we have clearly unleashed the entrepreneurial energies of our people. India is now growing at a much higher trajectory. We are almost a two-trillion-dollar economy. Of course, this year, we are expected to grow at about 5 percent but we were growing at 8 to 9 percent. Every year, we are adding something like $180 billion to the size of our GDP. I see great opportunities for Nepal in benefitting from this huge economic growth that is taking place in India. I think the challenge is to identify sectors where Nepal can take advantage of this economic growth.
Going back to the question of security, what are the specific areas of concern India has with Nepal vis-à-vis the open border?
There have been terrorism-related cases, fake Indian currency smuggling, gold smuggling and trafficking of protected species. Also, because we have an open border, someone commits a crime in one country and runs to the other. I think this is a problem for both countries.
The open border between India and Nepal can bring a lot of positive advantages but sometimes, unfortunately, they are also misused by people who do not have the best interests of the two countries at heart. I think both countries are committed to ensuring that this misuse is minimised and prevented.
On that, how would you describe the current framework for cooperation vis-à-vis border security? And what level of satisfaction do you have in terms of our security establishment’s execution of the existing framework?
We have very good cooperation between the Indian and Nepali security forces. I think the legal frameworks could be improved. At a political level, we have to be very conscious of each other’s interests and requirements. At the execution level too there is good cooperation now. What is good about this cooperation is that it is now taking place in smaller units at the operational level. Of course, it is important at the central level but to improve security, it is more important to have good cooperation at the level of the border districts. This is moving on very satisfactorily. We have regular border district coordination meetings where these issues are discussed.
You talked about the porous border. Do you think putting a registration mechanism in place for citizens of both countries would help control fake currency smuggling and other terrorist activities?
At the fundamental level, I think open borders are a very good thing. If you look at all the regional cooperation and organisations wherever they exist, they have completely open borders like in the European Union. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) is also moving in that direction. But an open border sometimes leads to problems. Clearly, we have to step up our cooperation and coordination to ensure that the benefits are maximised and the problems are minimised. To do so, you definitely need to have regulation and more patrolling along the border but the border needs to remain open. This has been so traditionally for centuries. People of the two countries have such close relationships across the border, you may even go shopping from one country to the other or a school. People cross the border many times in a day. This lies at the heart of the relationship between the two countries. So I would like to encourage this, rather than control it.
One area where Nepal has clear potential is hydropower. Nepal’s hydropower establishment has requested India to reciprocate in a power-sharing agreement but that has not happened at the government level. Should it occur, prospective investors would at least know that there is a power-exchange mechanism in place and they can invest within that framework knowing very well that they have an assured market in India.
For your readers’ information, I would like to say that, India, despite being a power-deficit country, actually exports power to Nepal. We have committed to export some 200 megawatt of power to Nepal. Second, hydropower possibly offers the most significant opportunity to strengthen economic cooperation between the two countries. There are many ways in which this can be done. It can be done at the government-to-government level, as we have committed in the Pacheshwor Multipurpose Project under the Mahakali Treaty. It could be done at the private sector level, as is being done in the case of Upper Karnali or Upper Marsyangdi or even Arun III where Indian private companies have been given the opportunity to develop them. What has happened over the years is that progress has been extremely slow. In fact, we have not had a major hydropower project for many decades. And sometimes, people tend to become cynical.
As to the power-trade agreement, it is certainly very important. But if I may inform you, India has already put power-trade under the OGL (Open General Licence). So you are free to trade power with India without any licence or specific approval. As far as I understand, from a technical perspective, in hydropower projects, a certain basic minimum has to be sold through a long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and you trade at the margins. So the viability of the project is not actually determined by the share of the power you trade but by the long-term PPA you have. The power trade price can go up and down, that is on the margin. So I don’t think that the power trade between the two countries, whether it be at the government or private sector level, is held up because of the power trade agreement. But yes, we do have a proposal for a power trade agreement, which is under consideration at the Government of India. And we will do whatever is required to promote and step up cooperation.
The current transmission line that runs from Dhalkebar in Nepal to Muzzafarpur in India is not complete yet. During our rainy season, we have a power surplus which can be exported to India. But we haven’t been able to do so because of the current infrastructure, ie, the transmission line does not support it. Progress on the Indian side has not been very satisfactory.
I agree with you. I think it is very important to set up infrastructure that will allow for power exchange and trade. Right now, we are engaged in the development and renovation of three transmission lines. It is currently a point-to-point power exchange. Eventually the idea should be to connect the two (Nepal and India’s) electricity grids so that there is seamless transmission of power. I remember reading in one of the newspapers a couple of weeks ago that because of the lack of Indian customs clearance, loadshedding in Nepal is going to increase by so many hours everyday. We, of course, rebutted that very strongly.
This is a very high priority project. India is already committed to exporting more than 200 MW of power to Nepal and that can only happen if the transmission lines are upgraded. In order to make sure that the transmission lines are upgraded, certain procedural things and customs and other related formalities have to be completed. All these have been explained to the Nepal Electricity Authority and I am happy to say that are working very strongly on all these issues.
India is helping Nepal in various small projects like building schools and health centres all over the country. Some people wonder, why doesn’t India concentrate on investing in large infrastructural projects rather than providing such scattered assistance to Nepal? Is there a possibility for doing so instead?
First of all, thank you for raising this question. I would like to give you some information about the scope and range of our assistance. India is assisting in some 484 projects in Nepal at a total cost of something like 60 billion Nepali rupees. It is a very huge assistance programme. This does not include the concessional lines of credit that we have given. In recent years, we have two ongoing lines of credit of 350 million dollars for infrastructural development. So India has a huge assistance and partnership programme and this covers both large and small projects. The Mahendra Highway, the East-West optical fibre network to facilitate internet and mobile telecommunications in Nepal, the BP Koirala Institute for Health Sciences and trauma centre in Kathmandu are some of the large infrastructural projects. There are also some irrigation projects and Tarai roads projects: some 1,400 km of roads are to be developed. We are developing railway lines along the India-Nepal border, integrated check posts. And we have over 225 small projects like schools, dispensaries, small roads.
Our approach is a combination of large and small development projects. But I agree with you that we need to review some of our schemes and particularly our small development schemes. I am very keen to ensure two things now. First, that the local community is a genuine stakeholder in that project; they want the project. Second, we must ensure that these projects are sustainable.
The other component of the question is, are there any large infrastructural projects with Indian assistance that coming up?
Well, we have the Tarai roads projects and the integrated check posts project. These are two very large infrastructural projects. We also have the transmission lines projects financed under Indian lines of credit. There are also other projects in the pipeline in which more discussions need to be held: like a bridge on the Mahakali River and talk of a Mid-hill highway. But I think we must focus our energies on what we have.
That brings us to our last segment, international relations. Do you see any cooperation between India and China in large infrastructural projects in Nepal?
First of all, cooperation between India and China is very robust. Our bilateral trade is around $65 billion and likely to go up a $100 billion in the next couple of years. Cooperation between the two cou-ntries is very vibrant, robust and mutually beneficial, including in the power sector in India. Certainly, there could be cooperation between our companies.
The point is, has there been any discussion regarding India and China jointly investing in a large infrastructure project in Nepal?
For many large projects you need huge amount of resources. And where are these resources going to come from? You need companies that have to undertake engineering, procurement and construction contracts. Most of these projects are through global contracts. Clearly, there are opportunities. As far as India or Nepal is concerned, the primary objective is to develop power. You need energy to fuel your economy, just as India needs it for the same. I think there are opportunities and the private sectors engaged are conscious of it. But the first thing to do is get a power development agreement. Only then can you start talking about financial closure and awarding of contracts and so on. Right now, even the PPAs have not even been finalised, though discussions have been going on for a long time.
What are convergent and divergent views of India and China regarding Nepal’s politics and transition?
I can talk about India. I think peace and stability in Nepal is very important for India. I think that is the same for China. Clearly, there is convergence in terms of the objective of peace, security, stability and prosperity in Nepal. I must say that the international community as a whole has worked very closely in recent years, even in terms of political transitions that have been taking place in Nepal. You would recall, 10 days prior to the last Constituent Assembly elections, people were skeptical including many journalists. There were questions whether the election would be held or not even one week before the election. And the international community stood as one and supported this whole process. I think it is not only India and China but this general convergence amongst the international community in terms of how they see developments in Nepal and the overall goal of stability and peace.
There seems to be a certain level of nervousness about Chinese investments in Nepal in the Indian intelligentsia and among its think tanks, which is clearly reflected in the Indian media.
The defining characteristic of our times is the economic rise of Asia: of India, of China and the continent as a whole. The centre of global economic gravity is shifting towards Asia. Clearly, the Asian footprint is going to expand, not only in Asia but all over the world. So the Chinese are investing in India, Nepal, South-east Asia, Europe, Africa. Indians are doing the same. We are talking about connectivity between India and Asean. We are talking about driving from Calcutta to Kunming and the Bangladesh-China, India-Myanmar forum for regional cooperation initiative. As economies get more interdependent, more interlinked, this will be a factor in promoting stability in the countries concerned. India and China have very vibrant and strong cooperation in every sector.
So how do you explain the unease that we encounter regarding Chinese investments in Nepal?
I cannot speak for individual analysts or strategic experts. Perhaps you have to address the question to them. What I am trying to say is that this is the development of our times. And you have to see how best you can take advantage of these developments.
Moving on, what kind of relationship does Washington, another major ally, and New Delhi share vis-à-vis Nepal?
Let me tell you again that India and Washington also have a very vibrant and robust relationship based on shared democratic norms and values. Clearly, we discuss issues of mutual interest. If we have a bilateral discussion then we might discuss developments in the region. For instance, we would like very much to know what is going on in Afghanistan. These are normal state-to-state interactions. The ambassadors here meet from time to time; I meet with the Chinese ambassador and the American ambassador.
As Kathmandu happens to be the Saarc capital, one of the major irritants for Saarc regionalism has been that India and Pakistan do not see eye-to-eye on regional issues. Where do you see this going?
See, when Saarc was conceived, it was precisely for this reason. It was agreed that bilateral issues would be kept out of Saarc. The idea was, you may have political differences but that does not prevent you from having economic cooperation, which can be mutually beneficial.
But the fact is that intra-regional cooperation has developed from strength to strength in Asean. Their intra-regional trade now runs in the billions. Saarc, however, is stuck where we started.
I agree with you. Our progress has been slow and not at a satisfactory pace. Ideally, as I said, we should put aside political differences and focus on the economic situation, which is win-win for all the countries concerned.
MAR 03 - Minendra Rijal , the new minister for information and communications, has steadily established himself as one of the key leaders in the Nepali Congress (NC). Though he couldn’t get a party ticket to contest the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections from the crowded Morang district, the party leadership has entrusted him some crucial responsibilities in recent times—first, he was the brain behind finalising the NC’s Proportional Representation list after the CA elections; second, he was a member of the taskforce that handled the party’s Cabinet negotiations. For some time now, Rijal has also been the party’s go-to man to reach out to other parties. This says a few things about Rijal: the party leadership trusts him to ‘feel the pulse’ of the NC rank-and-file; but as importantly, they see him as a serious negotiator who can deftly handle intra- and inter-party relations. Akhilesh Upadhyay and Binod Ghimire talked to the newly sworn-in minister last Friday at his Singha Durbar office.What are the government’s top priorities?
Our top priority is creating an environment that is conducive to writing the constitution within a year. It’s the job of the CA to write the constitution but the government can create a political environment for it. The current government, formed by the two largest parties in the country, has the challenge of winning the confidence of other parties in the CA so that they feel that they will have a role in constitution writing. At the same time, we should also be able to give them the message that the people have endorsed the agendas of the NC and CPN-UML and the two parties represent their voice. However, that does not mean that things that are significantly important to the Maoists and Madhes-based parties will not be addressed.
Already, one criticism against the new government is that it has not been representative of broader diversity in its bid to manage intra- and inter-party dynamics?
You have a point there. I see both sides of this argument. Yes, making the government a little more diverse would probably have sent a much better signal. But again, the message we have gotten from the CA is that ‘it’s not just the people of my identity who can represent me’. People of any identity can represent important issues.
Still, will the Cabinet be expanded at some point?
I don’t see a case for its expansion with more ministers from the NC or UML. But we want the Madhes-based parties to join us. The three portfolios presently with the PM are to bring the Madhes-based parties with significant representation in the CA on board.
On a broader issue of constitution making, the Maoists and Madhesi constituencies have expressed fear that the NC and UML could try to turn back the clock as far as the early 1990s.
We will not repeat the mistake the Maoists made in the previous CA. The largest party in the CA made no effort to win confidence of other parties to build a broad-based coalition for constitution writing. They probably had thought once they were in the seat of government, the constitution was not important. That is probably the reason why the Pushpa Kamal Dahal-led government interfered in many issues including in the Nepal Army and it had to pay a heavy price for that.
When they came to the government again with Baburam Bhattarai, I had a feeling that they had learnt their lessons but they clearly hadn’t. There was an agreement among big four parties, 12 days before the CA deadline, that the constitution would be promulgated through consensus. But the Maoists consciously sabotaged the whole agreement, creating a situation where constitution writing simply became impossible. We will not repeat these mistakes.
What would the NC-UML do to create this broad-based coalition you talk about and that you don’t repeat the mistakes?
First, the broader mandate, expressed in the election, has to be honoured, meaning the support the NC and UML got. We cannot write a constitution that is contrary to the people’s mandate. But at the same time, this shouldn’t be construed as the authority to exclude others from having their say in the constitution.
Obviously, federalism was the major bone of contention that led to the collapse of the last CA. How do you want the country to be federated?
I am sure that the Maoist leadership understands the mood of the country. I hope that they will find a very clever way to revise their stance on federalism. Once they do that, it will be a lot easier for us to reach out to them.
But aren’t you again falling into the trap of being reactive? As you have the mandate, why don’t you lay out the agendas more proactively?
What we should do is to articulate the common NC-UML suggestions on federalism and approach the Maoists and the Madhes-based parties for their input. Once they are on board, this can be resolved.
What specifically is your broader blueprint on federalism?
People do not want too many states. The consensus in the previous CA was, states would be delineated on the basis of identity and viability. The Maoists and Madhesi parties argued that identity was the only criteria. We said viability is equally important. Now, the people have clearly given a mandate for viability and identity.
How many federal states are viable?
We proposed seven federal states in our manifesto, so did the UML. This sounds like a reasonable number.
Regarding the other bone of contention, the form of governance, where do you see the meeting point?
Even the UML’s stance on the form of governance is different from the NC’s. But when we sit down to talk of power sharing, election of President, Speaker and so on, everybody seems to have in their mind the Prime Minister as the chief executive, directly accountable to the Parliament, and an indirectly elected President who would be largely ceremonial.
But the UML’s idea of forms of governance is different from NC’s.
Yes, they want a directly elected prime minister. But if you read between the lines of the seven-point agreement between the two parties, clearly the UML has in the back of its mind where the PM is the chief executive of the country, elected and accountable to the Parliament.
Do you think there is a need for a broad cross-party mechanism, as the High Level Political Mechanism before the November elections?
Yes, but has to be inside the CA, not outside of it.
Are the NC and UML discussing the larger political roadmap, such as local elections in the summer?
I am quite hopeful. First, the people want local elections. Donors who pour a lot of money in Nepal and spend that money through the local bodies very strongly support it. More importantly, if you look back at the past few years, corruption has permeated to the grassroots and no matter how serious we are at the central level, our service delivery mechanism will not work.
What are the difficulties in holding local elections?
First, probably the Maoists and the Madhesi parties will think that the NC and UML will abuse their position of power. We need to have a mechanism whereby elections are fair, independent and the parties in the government cannot influence it to their advantage.
What are the Maoists and Madhesi parties saying in your inter-party talks?
I should be honest in admitting that until now, we were held up by government formation. But now, it’s time to reach out to the opposition. I think the Prime Minister will talk to the Maoists and Madhesi parties after he returns from the BIMSTEC summit—on constitution writing, holding local elections and broader issues of governance.
How are you going to take Rastriya Prajatantra Party-Nepal on board? One of their major arguments is that the whole CA process has to be revisited.
They are smart people to understand that if they push too hard they will probably not be able to get anything at all. But if they play their cards well they could get something that is of significant importance to them.
What would that be?
There will be absolutely no compromise on the issue of federalism, demo-cracy and republic. We are a secular country. The state cannot preach one religion or the other. But the freedom of religion does not give anybody the right to force anyone to change his/her religion.
On governance, what kind of policy and programmes will the new government come up with?
First, facilitating and creating a conducive environment to write a constitution that institutionalises federal democratic republic. Second, lay a foundation for national development. We want to give a sense to the people of Nepal that the country has started moving in the right direction. Sector-wise, the priorities will be hydropower, tourism, redefining agricultural development.
One major concern is of law and order.
The first reason people seek a government is for law and order.
One big criticism of political party leaders has been their growing nexus with criminal groups.
This is something no civilised society can tolerate. If we hope to get the support of people in any sense we must attend to it immediately.
Senior police officials have said on record that each time they arrest criminals, they get telephone calls from powerful politicians to free them.
Yes, political leaders may have access but at the same time, putting all the blame squarely on them is unwarranted.
Do you know any criminals? Do you get calls when they are arrested?
No, I don’t know any.
(The answer to the question But the UML's idea of forms of governance is different from NC's should have said 'Yes, they want a directly elected prime minister', instead of 'Yes, they want a directly elected president'. The error is now corrected.)
MAR 10 - With an elected government in office, Nepal’s political process is looking up. Development partners see this as a window of opportunity to get much needed reforms back on track, which will vastly contribute to foreign investment in capital-intensive projects, including the under-performing hydropower sector. The International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group, recently initiated closed-door consultations with new Finance Minister Ram Sharan Mahat and Rastra Bank governor Yubaraj Khatiwada, among others. Among experts invited for panel discussions was Ajaya Dixit, a water resources engineer. Pranaya SJB Rana and Dewan Rai spoke to Dixit about the broader hydrwopower debate, how activism in the 90s contributed to hydro underdevelopment and the important, often contentious, relations with India in sharing water resources.Since the formation of a pro-market NC-led government, there has been renewed interest in hydropower. Has there been a better time to focus on developing the hydropower sector?
The expectation of political stability seems to have generated interest among donors, national and international actors and renewed calls for reforms. The present government must learn from post 1990 experience when Nepal faced a neo-liberal agenda pushed as an ideology, even though Nepal had very little wherewithal to deal with its tenets. Nepal needed to introduce various reforms but also required safety net and other social support systems. Our governments, of the NC and left parties, which espoused democratic socialism, were overwhelmed by hubris. The governments failed to put in place appropriate regulatory mechanisms that would balance market interest with the capacity of the population and local institutions. Today, we can see the worsening performance of basic public institutions. Nepal does need more investments and reforms to achieve higher growth and meet social development goals. Reforms, however, are not only about rate of returns and cost benefit calculus but also about adherence to rule of law, access to information and just mechanism for distributional benefits across society.
What are some obstacles to developing hydropower?
Some of the barriers are inconsistent policy, procedural delays, poor coordination among government agencies and interference of cartels and syndicates. A glaring one is lack of vision. We can examine a recent pronouncement as food for thought. While inaugurating a trade fair organised by FNCCI and Ministry of Trade and Commerce, President Ram Baran Yadav stressed the need to promote Nepali products locally and globally. Nepal’s business community and a section of the government seem to recognise that the Nepali economy needs to be diversified; we produce high value goods and trade them globally. This framework can be Nepal’s engine of growth but it is not possible without 24/7 supply of clean energy. Hydro-power can be a cornerstone of this framework, within which state agencies, utilities, regulatory commissions, IPPs, banks and community groups play their roles. This framework is counter to the prevailing political eco-nomy, which stipulates that Nepal will become rich by exporting energy. The former framework has the potential to take the Nepali people on a path to prosperity while the latter would provide financial gains to the government with royalties, if selling rates are agreed. In the meantime, we must over-come barriers and build problem-solving skills, improve implementation and compliance, monitor, learn and adapt to emerging constraints and make adaptive policies. There is no shortcut to prosperity.
Would you say that activism in the 90s against big hydropower projects contributed to holding back the hydropower sector?
Dam building and hydropower have been major elements of the development process. Earlier efforts brought many benefits but also high social and environmental costs that remained un-mitigated. Environmental movements globally highlighted and questioned these costs, calling for changes in prevailing practices. For me, the 1980s and 1990s were periods of unlearning because the science I had been educated with did not seem to deliver what it promised. Nepali women had to walk three hours to get drinking water, irrigation systems did not function, very few Nepalis had access to energy and our technological capacity was very low. Nepalis were sick because they did not use toilets. These realities continue. Science taught me to look around, ask questions, critique, seek answers, propose ideas and be questioned. Yes, I was part of the critical discourse. I contributed to expand understanding, introducing inter-disciplinarity in water education and pluralizing the policy space. These are useful starting points for proposing new business models to developing hydropower as well as building societal resilience in the face of vulnerability to global climate change.
Some would argue that one of the flaws of democracy is that so much time is spent on debating that things often take a long time to get moving. Was that what happened?
Alternative to democracy is more stable democracy. In the era prior to 1990, critical development questions could not be asked while societal pains, concerns, expectations and difficulties were kept under the carpet. Even during the era of democratic polity these issues remained unheard. Our challenge is to formulate a social and political compact that will nurture an innovative architecture of hydropower development within a broader framework that suits our natural and social landscape. Hydro is not only energy but also water that has multiple functions: agriculture, health, recreation, fishery, culture and ecosystem. It is also about climatic disasters such as floods, landslides and sedimentation that pose serious risks to projects and infrastructures. We need stable democracy to be able to better understand different aspects of water and its uses.
If the Arun III project, to which many, including you, were opposed, had come online, wouldn’t that have created more opportunities for investment and manufacturing?
Prior to 1990, Nepal followed a unitary hydropower development path. Finance would come from donors, projects would be designed and implemented by international consultants and contractors. The Arun project continued this model, which did not build local technical capacity nor enhance the national manufacturing base or create opportunities for local investors. When multiparty democracy began, many questions were raised: why were no Nepali technical experts, investors, banking sector or community groups part of this enterprise? High costs and donor’s conditions were also questioned. Between 1996 and 2002, Nepal was able to add more than 300 MW to the system through private and public investments. From 1911, when hydropower first came to Nepal, to 1996, Nepal produced less than 300 MW. The idea that Nepali private investors and bankers would also be involved in producing electricity and that community groups will distribute electricity was inconceivable in early 1990s. The achievement of 1996-2002 has since slipped into the dark pits of power cuts. This policy paralysis needs to be critically examined and this is best done by a younger generation. The debates also produced ideas such as local currency bonds to raise money for hydropower development. It seems IFC is currently seeking to issue such bonds in concurrence with the government and Nepal Rastra Bank. The bond may help channel capital, including remittance income, into hydropower investment.
So who is responsible for us living in 12 hours of darkness each day?
We have to look at these questions in a historical context. When the democratic journey began, the Nepali state, political parties and all of us had to learn to deal with globalisation and liberalisation. The state was unable to meet its many obligations and deliver services. The insurgency, palace massacre and derailed democratic process, including no local elections, set in a policy paralysis. So it is hard to pinpoint responsibility. As we move forward now, our elected representative must be made responsible and accountable for governance and policy framing. The conduct of past legislatures was unsatisfactory. This must change and the new political order must begin consolidating gains while avoiding past mistakes. Recent news reports, however, do not inspire confidence. Few days ago, speaker Subas Nembang had to adjourn the CA meeting for a lack of quorum, as representatives were chitchatting and sipping tea while discussions on ordinance were going on. Elected representatives need to take a deep breath, reflect and do some soul searching about their historical responsibility. Let us also remember those Nepalis still without access to even basic light.
Nepal has a number of treaties with India concerning hydropower and our rivers. The question of power sharing with India inevitably comes up. How do we address this issue when we ourselves are under loadshedding?
India is our friend; we are members of the same civilisation. But there is power asymmetry between the two countries and this tends to fuel a sense of frustration on the weaker side because it is not easy to convince big brother. I would call India our elder sister, though this idea is not mine. Elder sisters are kind, listen, understand and accept. Still, the geopolitical context remains. The Himalayan hydrology requi-res us to put flood mitigation, irrigation and climate change vulnerabilities on the table. In the immediate, our government’s priority must be to overcome endemic loadshedding. Let us begin to unpack the notion of cooperation and develop modalities for sharing forward and backward linkage benefits.
On a final note, the Mahakali treaty is back in the news after a long time, with Prime Minister Sushil Koirala’s recent statements concerning Tanakpur. The agreement is reportedly moving forward now. Given the widespread opposition back when the treaty was signed, how do you feel about it?
The Mahakali treaty includes Pancheswor dam and also incorporates Tanakpur and Sarada barrages. The Sarada barrage feeds Sarada canal system, which epitomised the peak of a centralised, top down, bureaucratic and engineering-led paradigm. Engineering is necessary but this approach considered ecosystems, gender, participation, displacement and equity as peripheral. The Mahakali treaty is a manifestation of this paradigm and its critique juxtaposed the role of the state, geopolitics, national politics, water resources and conception of development as well as peripheral elements. How will Mahakali treaty and the proposed Pancheswor dam help improve overall wellbeing of our two countries, our people and build trust further? What institutional innovations will meet the changing needs and aspirations? Let our two governments answer these questions.
MAR 17 - The last local elections were held in 1997 and after the five-year term of the representatives expired, village, district and municipal bodies across the country have been running without elected officials. Last year, the four main political forces—the Nepali Congress (NC), CPN-UML, UCPN (Maoist) and Madhesi parties—expressed their commitment to hold local elections in Spring 2014. Post Constituent Assembly (CA) election last November, the NC and UML are still pushing for local elections while the Maoist and Madhesis are in favour of postponing polls to after the promulgation of a new constitution. Meanwhile, the Election Commission (EC) has been hard at work preparing for polls. Bhadra Sharma and Darshan Karki spoke to the Chief Election Commissioner Neel Kantha Uprety about the need for polls, whether it could distract CA members from constitution writing and lessons learnt from the November elections.How are preparations going for local elections?
The Interim Constitution mentions that the EC will conduct three elections. First, an election to a CA, which has been held twice. Second, local elections; and if necessary, a referendum. But the date for local polls has not been fixed yet nor has the ‘how’ to conduct the elections been decided. Since the framework is laid out by the law, the current Local Body (Election Procedures) Act 1992 needs to be amended and updated. The EC is currently waiting for the laws to be changed and the government to send us in writing the date to hold elections.
What needs to be amended in the law?
As local elections are being held after a long gap of about 17 to 18 years, ensuring inclusion and proportional representation among local representatives is of key importance. It is important to decide the percentage of women’s representation in local councils, district committees, wards and municipalities. There are also some contradictions between the Procedures Act and the Local Self-Governance Act 1999 regarding the qualifications of local representatives. The Election Procedures Act states that people who have been convicted of a crime but completed their sentence can take part in the elections after six years while the Governance Act qualifies people to be candidates three years after the end of their sentence.
The Nepali Congress is seeking to change a provision in which, it argues, the Chief District Officer (CDO) is assigned the responsibility of local chief election officer.
This is traditional practice, not a provision in the Act. The provision states that the EC will assign the election officer but it does not specify that it has to be the CDO. In the 1997 local-level elections, the EC assigned the CDO as chief election officer. Now we have election offices and election officers in all 75 districts so the EC can nominate any officer at the district level as chief election officer.
Can you explain the process of holding a local-level election?
According to existing law, we need to conduct elections in three phases. The EC wants to do away with this provision as it might take more or less phases to conduct the elections. It is a complicated procedure wherein voters will elect around 256,000 people. The law also mentions national parties, which were then only four in number. The rest would file an application to take part in the elections independently. Currently, there are 130 registered parties, of which 122 took part in the November elections and 30 are currently represented in the CA. So even if only 30 parties take part in the elections, the size of the ballot paper will be very big. Also, there will definitely be independent candidates. In November, we had prepared 241 different kinds of ballot papers. In the local elections, each ward will need a different ballot paper. There are around 3,915 VDCs and each VDC has nine wards. There are also municipalities to account for. So this is a complicated election to hold.
In the November election, the issue of threshold became highly controversial. Will it be implemented this time?
Local elections are held under first-past-the-post-system. A threshold can only be easily applied to a proportional election system. However, a threshold can be introduced in defining national parties based on the number of seats they obtained in the November elections. This would make it easier to manage the elections. But it is up to the political parties to decide.
The last local-level election was accused of not being inclusive. How does the EC plan to ensure representation of different ethnic groups?
As far as local elections are concerned, I feel that there is a need to ensure proportional representation of two groups: men and women. There already exists a provision in the law to nominate people from marginalised groups.
How do you plan to ensure women’s representation?
The EC is for 50 percent representation of both sexes. In the 1997 local elections, there was a one-seat quota for women as a member of the Ward Committee. This must be increased. Given the level of women empowerment over the years, we have seen that women can easily take up leadership positions. And I don’t think there will be a shortage of women candidates either. But this too should be decided by the political parties.
Can elections be held in May/June?
The voters, candidates and number of officers required to conduct the elections are all at the local level. The EC needs one month to update the voters’ list and the ballot papers can be printed in different stages for the polls. The elections itself can be completed within a month and a half. But time is passing and if things remain the same, it will be difficult to hold polls soon. Yet, a lot can be accomplished in a week if there is political will. First, the government should fix a date for the election in consensus with different political parties. Then there are amendments to existing laws. One way to do this is by formulating a new law altogether, though this take a long time. The other option is to amend selected acts related to local elections. This can be done through Some Nepal Laws Amendment Act.
Some parties are arguing that holding local elections will hinder constitution writing.
Polls will be held in voting stations across the country, not in the CA. The district level, area level and village level leaders of different parties are already there. If the presence of central-level leaders and CA members were a must in villages, then it would have been plausible to argue that local level elections would be a distraction. But I do not see the need for anyone to be present apart from voters and local candidates. This, however, could be my simple-minded understanding. And if this is the incorrect way of seeing things, it would be nice if the political parties explained the situation in clear terms to everyone, including the people.
If polls are not held in May/June, when can they be held next?
The Interim Constitution clearly states that the Government of Nepal will fix the date for elections. Had it said the EC can fix the date for elections and conduct periodic elections, things would have been different. If political parties had shown that much trust in this institution, two local elections would have already been held and we would be preparing for the third one. Even if elections cannot be held immediately, announcing the date will help make voters aware and enthusiastic about polls.
There is also the worry that elections will harm the cause of federalism and distort the debate.
From a technical point of view, it has already been decided that the country will be federated. However, states cannot be carved out on paper. Areas need to be delineated and boundaries need to be fixed. And perhaps this will need consensus among people of different districts and villages as to where the rivers and roads lie. This process could give rise to controversies. In that case, will the Prime Minister go to sort out the territories? Or will the local leaders resolve the disputes? Will it be easier when locally-elected bodies are in place or if the central government decides this? Those who want to strengthen a centralised form of governance do not want elections at the VDC level.
What lessons did the EC learn while holding the November elections? What challenges did it face and are they relevant for local elections?
In other countries, elections are held within weeks of announcing the election date. This is because they have everything ready. Agencies that hold elections need not go to Japan in search of ballot boxes, to China for other materials and to Europe for money. If it was the same for us, we could hold elections immediately too. Our time gets wasted collecting and updating materials. So even a two-three month period is a very short time for us. To change this, preparations for elections should continue in a cyclic pattern and when dates are fixed, polls can be held instantly. In November, the EC distributed the voters’ ids in a hurry and some people who had registered were left out. The ballot box was also of low quality. We took whatever was given. Election supplies are sensitive and it would be nice if the EC could use materials made in Nepal.
There were also problems while transporting election materials. Helicopters and trucks were used but because it was not done systematically, various materials were destroyed. In some places, officers could not accompany the election materials. In the local elections, however, election materials only need to be taken to the polling stations. They need not be transported back. Elections are held, votes counted and results are published, all at the local level
